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INTRODUCTION
Since 1965, the reliance requirement of SEC Rule 10b-51 has
evolved into a general rule and two exceptions. The general rule
states that a plaintiff must prove .reliance upon a defendant's
fraudulent conduct to recover in 10b-5 actions based on material
misrepresentations or omissions. 2 The test for reliance, set out in
a Second Circuit decision, List v. Fashion Park, Inc. ,3 is whether
the plaintiff would have acted any differently if he or she had
known the truth.4
The Supreme Court articulated the first exception to the List
rule in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.5 Under
this decision, plaintiffs are not required to prove reliance in lOb-5
actions involving "primarily a failure to disclose." ' 6 Lower courts
have interpreted Affiliated Ute as creating a presumption of reli-
ance that is rebuttable by the defendant. 7
A second exception to the List rule arose in Blackie v. Barrack.8
In this case, the Ninth Circuit decided to 'extend Affiliated Ute to
situations where material misrepresentations adversely affect the
price of stock traded in an efficient market. 9 According to this
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). See infra note 28 for the statutory contents of the
rule. Rule lOb-5 generally prohibits fraud by any person in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, and was promulgated pursuant to authority granted to the Securities
Exchange Commission under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
2 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nom., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
Id. at 463.
4Id.
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
6 Id. at 153.
7 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
8 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
9 Id. at 906.
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notion, known as the fraud on the market theory, a court will
adopt a rebuttable presumption of the plaintiff's reliance where
that plaintiff has traded in an efficient market and was injured by
the market's reaction to the defendant's fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions.' 0 The Supreme Court recently adopted the fraud on the
market theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson."
The Basic case embraced fraudulent misrepresentations in the
context of preliminary merger negotiations.' 2 Basic Incorporated
had denied its involvement in merger negotiations at a time when
it was meeting and conducting telephone conversations with Com-
bustion Engineering concerning a merger of the two companies. 3
Numerous former shareholders of Basic brought a class action
against the corporation and its directors alleging "false and mis-
leading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule lOb-5 .14 The shareholders claimed they lost money sell-
ing their Basic shares in the artificially depressed market created
by the company's fraudulent statements.15 The Supreme Court in
Basic affirmed the district court's class certification 6 by adopting
the presumption of reliance supported by the fraud on the market
theory. 17
The Basic decision is significant because it addresses two im-
portant issues in securities law: first, defining the proper standard
of materiality to apply under Rule lOb-5 to preliminary corporate
merger discussions; 8 and second, whether a presumption of reli-
ance supported by the fraud on the market theory should be applied
in situations involving material public misrepresentations. '9 This
Note will treat only the second issue addressed by the Supreme
Court, that dealing with fraud on the market.
,0 See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986).
" 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 978, 993 (1988).
12 Id. at 980.
' Id. at 981.
" Id. The class comprised those Basic shareholders who sold their stock after the
company's first public statement denying pre-merger negotiations and before the suspension
of trading in December of 1978. Id. at 987 n.5.
Is Id.
16 One prerequisite to class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual'members." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The presump-
tion of reliance in lOb-5 actions prevents individual questions of reliance from impeding
class certification.
" Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. __, 108 S. Ct. 978, 993 (1988).
See id. at 982-88.
See id. at 988-92.
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After a brief review of the statutory and common law origins
of the Rule 10b-5 implied cause of action in Part I of this Note, 20
Part II will examine the effect of the Basic decision upon the List
reliance requirement. 21 Part III will then discuss the omissions
exception to List as established in Affiliated Ute and as modified
by Basic.? Finally, Part IV of this Note considers the fraud on the
market exception to the List rule, and the impact of Basic on the
legal framework created by List and Affiliated Ute. 23
I. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF THE 1OB-5 RIGHT
OF ACTION
Both the Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 193425 allow parties to recover damages from statutory
violations through private civil actions.2 6 Although no specific stat-
utory authorization exists for a private cause of action under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act27 or its counterpart, SEC Rule
10b-5,2 the 10b-5 private judicial remedy today is firmly entrenched
20 See infra notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
2, See infra notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 82-106 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 107-215 and accompanying text.
2, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1981).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 770, 77s, 78a-78o, 780-3, 78p-78hh.
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 1, o (1981);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18(a), 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), p(b), r(a), t
(1981).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as nec-
essary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
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in federal law. 29
The implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 first
appeared in Kardon v. National Gypsum,3 ° a 1946 federal district
court opinion. The court in Kardon based its implied right of
action on the theory that the violation of a statute constitutes a
tort.31 The Supreme Court finally recognized the Rule lOb-5 implied
right of action in a 1971 decision, Superintendent of Insurance of
New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,32 long after scores of
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
Courts and commentators disagree whether to distinguish between the subparagraphs
of Rule lOb-5. Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1972) ("We do not read Rule lOb-5 so restrictively. To be sure, the second paragraph of
the Rule specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission
to state a material fact. The first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted."), with 5
A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 10B-5 § 9, 1-244 to 1-245 (1987) (footnote
omitted) ("This overlap [among the subsections] matters only if courts look at the Rule as
three separate provisions and glean different elements of a cause of action from each clause
.... [Tihe better approach is to require the same quantum of proof for all three clauses.").
See also infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citations omitted) ("Although § 10(b)
does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no
indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10(b)-5, contemplated
such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute and
the Rule is now well established."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975):
Despite the contrast between the provisions of Rule lob-5 and the numerous
carefully drawn express civil remedies provided in the Acts of both 1933 and
1934, (footnote omitted) it was held in 1946 by the United States District
Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that there was an implied private
right of action under the rule. (citation omitted). This court had no occasion
to deal with the subject until 25 years later, and at the time we confirmed
with virtually no discussion the overwhelming consensus of the District Courts
and Courts of Appeals that such a cause of action did exist.
Id. (citations omitted).
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
3, Id. at 513. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934), which states:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing
to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of
another if; (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect
an interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one
which the enactment is intended to protect.
Id. Courts have adopted statutory provisions as a basis for civil liability in actions for torts
other than negligence, such as trespass, deceit, nuisance, or strict liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 comment d (1965).
12 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is
implied under § 10(b)."). Accord Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 730.
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lower court decisions had already made such a recognition. 33 The
Supreme Court's decision is believed to be based on the idea that
a right of action could be implied from the Exchange Act's general
policy of protecting investors.3 4 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton,35 however, the Court moved away from this statutory impli-
cation theory toward a congressional intent theory36 to support the
implied lOb-5 right of action.37 As a result, most courts now look
to legislative intent as the principal justification for the implied
right of action under 10b-5. 38
11 See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir. 1965) ("The cause of
action arises by implication of the Act."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1961) ("Neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 expressly provides
for a civil remedy .... However, soon after the promulgation of that rule it was established
by decisional law that such a remedy for defrauded sellers is implied in that section and
rule."); Hooper v. Mountain State Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960) ("[W]e
now adopt ... the principles set forth in the trail-blazer decision of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co. . . . that a violation of rule lOb-5 gives rise to a private right of action;"),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953)
("[T]he weight of authority and best reasoning ... bring us to the conclusion that a civil
cause of action may be brought to enforce § 10."); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg., 188 F.2d
783, 787 (2nd Cir. 1951) ("[S]ection 10(b) ... does not explicitly authorize a civil remedy.
Since, however, it does make 'unlawful' the conduct it describes, it creates such a remedy.");
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1952)
(citations omitted) ("With respect to the argument that Section 10(b) does not provide for
civil action, it appears that several of the cases have already passed upon this question....
[T]he court is of the opinion Section 10(b) authorizes the remedy here pursued."); Robinson
v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (In rejecting defendant's contention "that
the Act does not create a civil right of action," the court recognized that similar arguments
had been rejected by a number of courts.); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457,
458 (D. Del. 1947) (following Kardon).
-1 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 28, § 8.02[c], at 1-233.
35 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
16 Id. at 568 ("[O]ur task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended
to create the private right of action asserted . .
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 311 (2d Cir. 1985)
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), wherein the court lists the criteria for "determining
if an implied cause of action exists" including "whether there is any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one[.]"), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir.
1985) (if a court finds that Congress did not intend a private cause of action under a
statute, then none can be implied), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); Florida Commercial
Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513, 1517 (1lth Cir. 1985) (one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether a statute creates an implied private right of action is
legislative intent); Bassler v. Central Nat'l Bank, 715 F.2d 308, 309-10 (7th Cir. 1983) (in
determining whether a statute creates an implied right of action, one relevant consideration
is legislative intent); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 388 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Elements of the Cort test are not weighed equally. "IT]he ultimate issue is whether Congress
intended to create a private cause of action."); Scientex Corp. v. Kay, 689 F.2d 879, 881
n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing Congressional intent as one factor in determining the
existence of an implied right of action.).
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I While the elements of a lOb-5 violation depend upon the type
of abuse that is pled,3 9 most jurisdictions agree that lOb-5 actions
involving misrepresentations or omissions commonly require not
only a misrepresentation or an omission, but also the elements of
materiality, scienter, reliance, and injury.40 These requirements mir-
ror the elements of the common law tort action of deceit, 41 upon
which the lOb-5 action is based. 42
Just how close the lOb-5 action should be to common law
deceit is unclear. Many courts view the relationship between an
1, 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 28, § 36, at j2-5. Jacobs recognizes no less than seven
distinct types of 10b-5 violations:
These abuses can be categorized as (1) misrepresentation and omission when
the defendant trades, (2) misstatement and concealment when the defendant
does not buy or sell, (3) mismanagement, (4) manipulation, (5) tipping im-
portant nonpublic data, (6) tender offers and exchange offers, and (7) activities
of broker-dealers and other fiduciaries.
Id. While much variety in the required elements exists between the various categories, the
elements of a lOb-5 action become considerably more uniform when analyzed within any
of the previously mentioned categories.
,0 See, e.g., Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1985) (In order to state a Rule 10b claim, the plaintiff "must allege that, in
connection with purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a
false material representation or omitted to disclose material information and that plaintiff's
reliance on defendant's actions caused him injury."); James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 205
(5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) ("Rule lOb-5 claim[s] require material misrepresentation,
scienter, reliance, diligence and injury"); Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 765 F.2d
1039, 1040 (11th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted) (Stating that the elements of a Rule lob-5
action are "(1) a misstatement or an omission; (2) of material fact; (3) made with scienter;
(4) on which the class reasonably relied; (5) which proximately caused the class' injury.").
41 The elements of the common law action for deceit include (1) a false representation;
(2) knowledge or belief by defendant of the false nature of the statement or of its lack of
basis; (3) intention to induce reliance by the plaintiff; (4) plaintiff's justifiable reliance
resulting in (5) damage to the plaintiff. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRTs 728 (5th ed. 1984). See Farrar v. Churchhill, 135 U.S. 609, 615 (1890) (fraudulent
misrepresentation must concern a material fact, must be false, must be relied upon by the
other party, and must have been made with a reasonable belief that it was false); Stewart
v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888) (discussion of common law tort
action of deceit); Ming v. Woolfolk, 116 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1886) ("The requisites to sustain
an action for deceit ... [are] the telling of an untruth, knowing it to be an untruth, with
intent to induce a man to alter his condition, and his altering his condition in consequence,
whereby he sustains damage."); Johnston v. Venturini, 294 F. 836, 838-39 (3d Cir. 1923)
(citing the elements listed in Ming, supra, as necessary for an action of deceit); Pain v.
Kiel, 288 F. 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1923) (elements of action for deceit are a false representation,
the speaker's knowledge of it's falsity, an intent to induce the other party to act, actual
reliance by the other party, and injury); Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 F. 10, 11 (6th
Cir. 1910) (statements made to induce purchase of stock were false and fraudulent and
made for the purpose of inducing such purchase were sufficient to establish cause of action
for deceit).
41 Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), modified,
459 U.S. 375 (1983).
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action for deceit and Rule 10b-5 as limited .4  These courts perceive
the use of common law principles in the securities context as
misleading." Their position is premised upon two considerations:
1) federal securities laws were intended in part to remedy deficien-
cies in the common law, 45 and 2) modern securities markets "in-
volving millions of shares changing hands daily" hardly resemble
the face-to-face transactions typical of the common law deceit
action. 47 Thus, these courts believe that the elements of lOb-5
should take into account the distinctions between modern securities
markets and the face-to-face transactions that were prevalent dur-
ing the development of the common law.48
In light of this reasoning, an appropriate solution is to selec-
tively apply principles from tort law to lOb-5 actions while closely
adhering to the policies underlying the securities acts.49 Much of
the case law interpreting Rule 10b-5 does borrow heavily from tort
concepts.5 0 The Supreme Court's affirmation of the "scienter"' 1
standard in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde5 2 is illustrative of this
41 See id. at 388.
" See id.
1, See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see
also Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 n.22 (citation omitted) ("Actions under Rule lOb-5 are distinct
from common law deceit ... and are in part designed to add to the protections provided
investors by the common law.").
, Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
4 See id.
" See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 194. See also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 744-
45 (Rule lOb-5 actions are distinct from common-law deceit).
,1 See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969) (Courts should not "import all the other aspects of common law fraud without
scrutiny."); see also Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUFFALo
L. REv. 205, 208-09 (1969-70); Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A
Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 666-67 (1964-65).
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 547 n.21, 555 (The implied cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 "is essentially a tort claim" derived from the common law action of deceit.), rev'd
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th
Cir. 1978) (10b-5 action is actually a tort claim); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-
94 (10th Cir. 1976) (court analogizes a lOb-5 action to tort action of deceit), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977); see G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961 n.32 (5th
Cir. 1981) (common law fraud is the interpretive source of securities law concepts); Straub
v. Vaisman & Co., 590 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976) (common law torts of misrepresentation
and deceit are relevant in interpreting Rule lOb-5); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (refusing to dispose of causation requirement because causation is
basic element of tort), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 824, 828-33 (1965).
" "Scienter" is a mental state requiring intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.




fact. Courts typically look for guidance in common law deceit
principles when adjudicating lOb-5 actions that closely resemble
early fraud cases.53 But where modern securities markets are in-
volved, courts will modify their understanding of Rule lOb-5 in
consideration of the additional complexities that arise from trading
on impersonal markets.5 4
II. FACE-TO-FACE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND THE LIST
RULE
Under Rule 10b-5, a material misrepresentation is an untrue
statement or distortion of a fact where there is a substantial like-
lihood that a reasonable investor would consider the fact important
in making an investment decision.55 A material misrepresentation
occurs when a corporate insider is aware of information that is
likely to be regarded as important to the average investor but
misrepresents that information, such as by convincing minority
shareholders of a closely-held corporation to sell their stock by
misrepresenting "that the company was unable and would be un-
able to pay dividends." ' 56 Because the Affiliated Ute and Basic
exceptions have severely restricted the role of reliance in omissions
and fraud on the market cases 5 7 material misrepresentations are
the last group of Rule 10b-5 cases to which the List rule still
applies.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc. ,5 the Second Circuit handed
down the general rule that plaintiffs must prove reliance in 10b-5
actions.5 9 The purpose of the reliance requirement is to insure that
a defendant's conduct has in fact caused the plaintiff's loss. 0
Without establishing this causal nexus between the illegal conduct
and the plaintiff's loss, the liability of the defendant is potentially
unlimited.61 For example, if plaintiffs were allowed to recover
5 See supra notes 49-52.
See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989-90.
See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
56 See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977).
17 See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
1' 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
11 Id. at 462.
60 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988) ("Reliance
provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a
plaintiff's injury.").
61 See Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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without proof of causation, defendants could be liable for all losses
to all investors who traded in a particular stock during the opera-
tional period of the fraud, including those investors who would
have traded regardless of the misrepresentation. Thus, courts look
to the List rule in order to "restrict the potentially limitless thrust
of Rule lOb-5 to those situations in which there exists causation in
fact between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury." 62 Most
commentators agree that because causation is an indispensable
element in common law tort actions, plaintiffs simply should not
recover in a lOb-5 action where a defendant's fraud has not caused
the plaintiff's loss. 63
According to List, the test of reliance is whether the plaintiff
would have acted any differently had the defendant told the truth. 4
This is to be distinguished from materiality, which asks whether
there is a substantial likelihood that a "reasonable investor" would
consider the fact important in making an investment decision. 65
Materiality, therefore, focuses on a hypothetical reasonable inves-
tor;6 reliance focuses on the particular investor who seeks recov-
ery.67 The overwhelming majority of Rule lOb-5 cases continue to
recognize the List rule, requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance in
actions involving face-to-face material misrepresentations.6 8
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981)
(citing Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 840 (1975)); see also Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1292 (2d
Cir. 1969) (Proof of causation necessary to prevent liability to "all the world."), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
63 See 3 A. BROmBERG, SEcurrrms LAw FaUD: SEC RULE 10B-5 § 8.7, 213 (1988);
L. Loss, FurDAImErAts OF SEcurrms REGTLATION 956 (2d ed. 1988); Note, The Reliance
Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HAgv. L. REv. 584, 589 (1975).
64 List, 340 F.2d at 463.
-See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
6 See Kungys v. United States, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1549-50 (1988)
(drawing materiality and reliance concepts from Rule lOb-5 to illustrate misrepresentations
in connection with citizenship orders and certificates of naturalization).
6 See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 28, § 64.01[a], at 3-311.
See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161-65 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying the fraud on
the market theory, but noting the traditional rule that plaintiffs in a lOb-5 case must prove
reliance); Madison Consultants v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 57, 62-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff satisfied
the reliance requirement by showing that, had a reasonable investor known of the defen-
dants' misstatement, the investor would have considered these misrepresentations in deciding
whether to take action to protect his investment); T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okl.
Irr. Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983) (adopting a fraud on the market
theory to establish the plaintiff's reliance that the bonds it purchased were lawfully issued
when in fact the defendant was prohibited from issuing any bonds under state law), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Wilson, 648 F.2d 88, 93-94 (recovery denied to plaintiff who
1989-90]
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In Basic, the Supreme Court reaffirmed reliance as a funda-
mental element of the 10b-5 cause of action.69 However, the Court
severely narrowed the reliance element in cases of material public
misrepresentations affecting stock traded on efficient markets by
adopting a presumption of reliance in such instances. 70
Several portions of the Basic decision indicate that the pre-
sumption of reliance only applies to those situations where the
security at issue is traded on an efficient market. Basic restates a
fundamental principle of the fraud on the market theory: "the
price of a company's stock [in an efficient market] is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and
its business." ' 7' Additionally, the Supreme Court observed that the
evidentiary difficulties associated with the presumption occur only
where the plaintiff has traded on an impersonal market. 72 Since
these factors only apply where a market is efficient, the Court
required that the shares in question must have been traded on an
efficient market for the plaintiff to enjoy the benefit of the pre-
sumption.73  The Court, however, failed to give any hint of the
standard by which a market will be determined to be efficient.
Because Basic retains reliance as an element of lOb-5, 74 List
still appears to apply to misrepresentation cases that occur in face-
to-face transactions. These face-to-face misrepresentation cases typ-
did not rely on defendant's faulty financial projections in purchasing defendant's stock);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (Plaintiff in a
misrepresentation case must show reliance but, in a nondisclosure case, need only show that
the facts were material "in the sense that a reasonable investor would've considered them
important."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1976); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
and Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 883-85 (5th Cir. 1973) (broker's customer could not recover
for specific nondisclosure in absence of proof of specific reliance on the omission); List,
340 F.2d at 457; Rosenberg v. Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (reliance
was a necessary element of plaintiff's state law claims for fraud and common law misrep-
resentation); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 257-59 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (relaxing the
reliance requirement where the plaintiff's claims are not based wholly on misrepresentations,
but include omissions by the defendant); Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1278,
1287 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (ordinary element of reliance is relaxed when plaintiff alleges an
omission or nondisclosure of material information); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D.
79, 84-85 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (proof of individual reliance is not necessary where the plaintiff's
claims include nondisclosure allegations).
69 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
70 Id. at 992-93.
7' Id. at 988 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61).
72 Id. at 990.
Id. at 992 n.27.
74 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ically involve closely held corporations,7 5 private placements, 76 or
customer-broker relations. 77 Because this type of fraud occurs in
personal transactions between individuals, the evidentiary difficul-
ties associated with proving fraud in impersonal markets are not
present.78 Thus, presuming reliance in face-to-face misrepresenta-
tion cases is inappropriate, absent some other proof problems.
Some of the language of Basic could be used to further erode
the List rule in misrepresentation cases. The Court in Basic noted
that making plaintiffs prove reliance in omissions cases is unfair
because plaintiffs would be forced to establish that they would
have acted differently if the defendant had disclosed the omitted
material information. 79 In other words, the plaintiff's case would
turn on speculation about how the plaintiff would have acted.80
Consequently, the Court held that placing the burden of proving
reliance upon the plaintiff in situations involving misrepresentations
also requires unfair speculation on the plaintiff's part, i.e., how
the plaintiff would have acted "if the misrepresentation had not
been made.""' While Basic limited its presumption to impersonal
71 See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 1977) (Plaintiff sold stock in
reliance on misrepresentations that "everything [was] ... going downhill" with regard to
a hotel venture.); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cit. 1976) (plaintiffs sold
stock in reliance on misrepresentations that the company was not able, and would not be
able, to pay dividends), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
76 See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1983) (Investors
who bought limited partnership interests in reliance on oral misrepresentations that the
investment involved "no risks" could not recover because the risks were clearly stated in
the private placement memorandum.); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 179,
194 (3d Cir. 1981) (investors who bought limited partnership interests in reliance on mis-
representations contained in tax opinion letter issued by the defendant accounting firm were
entitled to recovery), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
" See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1199 (8th Cir. 1978)
(Investor who refrained from transferring investment account to another firm in reliance
on the broker's misrepresentations that the transfer would be very costly and that the
account was undermargined was entitled to recovery against the broker.).
11 See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 (unfair evidentiary burden in omissions and misrepre-
sentations cases results from burden of proving reliance in impersonal markets).
79 Id.; see also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The
reason for shifting the burden on the reliance issue has been an assumption that the plaintiff
is generally incapable of proving that he relied on a material omission."), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982).
10 See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88
HLv. L. REv. 584, 590 (1975); see also Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.
1980) (action under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
951 (1980); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[I]n instances
of total non-disclosure ... it is of course impossible to demonstrate reliance."), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1975).
" See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 (citing Sharp, 649 F.2d at 188).
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market situations, the Supreme Court could easily extend this logic
to face-to-face misrepresentation cases as well.
III. AFFIIATED UTE AND THE OMISSIONS EXCEPTION
In Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,82 the Su-
preme Court formulated its first exception to the List rule. 83 Af-
filiated Ute held that proof of reliance is unnecessary in suits
primarily involving a failure to disclose information as long as "the
facts withheld [were] material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of [the in-
vestment] decision.' '84 Materiality in nondisclosure cases does not
require that investors would have altered their behavior in light of
the omitted fact; it merely requires that investors would have
considered the omitted fact significant to their investment deci-
sion."' Under Affiliated Ute, once a plaintiff establishes the obli-
gation to disclose and the withholding of a material fact, the causal
link is made and the burden of disproving reliance shifts to the
defendant. 86
Affiliated Ute spawned many interpretive problems among the
circuits. Although the Supreme Court indicated that reliance is not
required in omissions cases and did not even use the word "pre-
sumption, "87 Affiliated Ute has been interpreted by most lower
federal courts as adopting a rebuttable presumption of reliance.88
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
" List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
4 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
81 In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154; see also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 384 (1970). The existence of an obligation to disclose depends upon the particular
factual circumstances. For example, an insider or one possessing insider information must
either disclose the inside information or abstain from trading. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S.
at 153.
87 See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 128-63; Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341, 400 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
8 Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
Ute did not eliminate reliance as an element of a lob-5 omission case; it
merely established a presumption that made it possible for the plaintiffs to
meet their burden. When the Ute presumption attaches, the defendant may
rebut it by showing that the plaintiff did not rely on the defendant's duty to
disclose.
Id. at 468. See also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1987)
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The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rifkin v. Crow 9 provides a partic-
ularly descriptive summary of the operation of this presumption:
[W]here a lOb-5 action alleges defendant made positive misrepre-
sentations of material information, proof of reliance by the plain-
tiff upon the misrepresentation is required. Upon an absence of
proof on the issue, plaintiff loses. On the other hand, where a
plaintiff alleges deception by defendant's nondisclosure of mate-
rial information, the Ute presumption obviates the need for plain-
tiff to prove actual reliance on the omitted information. Upon a
failure of proof on the issue, defendant loses. But this presump-
tion of reliance in nondisclosure cases is not conclusive. If defen-
dant can prove that plaintiff did not rely, that is, that plaintiff's
decision would not have been affected even if defendant had
disclosed the omitted facts, then plaintiff's recovery is barred.9
Most of these cases justify the presumption on the ground that
ordinarily it will be impossible for plaintiffs to prove that they
relied on the absence of disclosure, i.e., something that was not
said.91 Thus, the presumption of reliance is viewed as a rule of
procedure.
Other courts treat Affiliated Ute as adopting an inference of
reliance, finding that the element of reliance reasonably follows
from a showing of materiality.92 This idea is known as constructive
(quoting Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220
(1988); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742 (l1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Sharp v. Cooper & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566
F.2d 631, 636 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977); Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); Anderson v. Bank of the South, 118 F.R.D. 136, 142-43 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
99 Rifkin, 574 F.2d 256.
10 Id. at 262 (footnotes omitted).
11 See Sharp, 649 F.2d at 188 ("This incapacity arises from the difficulty of proving
a speculative state of facts: Had the facts not been omitted, would plaintiff have acted on
the information made available and thereby averted his loss?"); Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos,
527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Where however, the violation arises from the non-
disclosure of a material fact, problems of proof arise because of difficulty in proving that
the plaintiff relied upon the non-existence of the fact which ultimately was shown to have
been present.").
92 See Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir.) ("When the alleged
fraudulent conduct involves primarily a failure to disclose, however, the plaintiff is not
required to prove reliance. Instead, reliance is inferred from materiality."), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 823 (1986); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1974) ("[A] plaintiff need not show reliance... but must still show the facts in question
were material."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d
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reliance. 93 Constructive reliance assumes that once a plaintiff shows
that a "reasonable investor" would have the propensity to rely
upon the fraud, the court should infer that the individual plaintiff
in fact did rely on the fraud. 94 Reliance, at that point, is a settled
issue.
95
The language in Basic Inc. v. Levinson96 supports the theory
that Affiliated Ute creates not a question of fact for the jury that
can be presumed or inferred, but a question of law for the court.
The only pertinent reference to Affiliated Ute in Basic speaks of
dispensing with the reliance element, not presuming it.97 According
to Basic, the plaintiff's demonstration of the defendant's breach
of the duty to disclose material information establishes the causal
connection between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's in-
jury.98 The Court made no reference at all to any shifting of the
burden of reliance to defendants in omissions cases. 99 The Court's
discussion of Affiliated Ute is, however, dicta, and may not prevent
the majority of lower federal courts from applying a rebuttable
presumption of reliance in nondisclosure cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Basic also indicates a possible
change of position for the Supreme Court regarding the theoretical
justification for Affiliated Ute. Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule
lOb-5 make unlawful a "course of business" or a "device, scheme,
or artifice" that operates as a fraud or deceit."00 Affiliated Ute
held that the defendants' conduct, in failing to inform the plaintiffs
that they.were market-makers, fell within at least one of these two
subsections. 0 1 Additionally, the Supreme Court found that because
subsections (a) and (c) do not encompass material misrepresenta-
234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) ("In cases involving non-disclosure of material facts ... materiality
rather than reliance thus becomes the decisive element of causation . . . [a]nd determination
of materiality allows logically an inference of reliance.") (citing Chris-Craft Indus., 480
F.2d 341); Pellman v. Cinerama, 89 F.R.D. 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("To establish
causation ... a plaintiff must prove that an omission was material; he need not prove that
he relied upon the absence of the information in making his decision."); Tucker v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[Rleliance will not be an individual
issue since causation may be presumed if the plaintiffs can prove ... materiality.").
91 See 5 A. JAcoas, supra note 28, at § 64.01[b][i].
94 Id.
91 See supra note 92.




1- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
101 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
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tions or omissions as does subsection (b), subsections (a) and (c)
of Rule 1Ob-5 operate free from any issue of reliance. 0 2 This
distinction recognized by the Court in Affiliated Ute follows from
the notion that subsections (a) and (c) expand upon traditional
notions of fraud by including under 10b-5 a broad variety of
conduct which may not constitute misrepresentations or omissions,
but which should be characterized as fraud even though its effect
upon the plaintiff's conduct cannot be firmly established.
In Basic, however, none of the Supreme Court's references to
Affiliated Ute mention any of the various subsections of Rule 10b-
5. Instead, the Supreme Court's discussion of Affiliated Ute fo-
cuses upon two ideas. First, the Court stated that proof of reliance
is not necessary where causation can be shown in other ways. 03
Second, Basic found that requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance upon
a material omission in "open market situations" results in an
unfair evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs. 1 4 Neither of these ideas
are found within the four corners of the Affiliated Ute opinion.
While the references in Basic are not entirely inconsistent with the
rationale of Affiliated Ute, they do indicate a clear shift in focus
away from a statutory interpretation of the subsections of Rule
10b-5 and demonstrate a new concern for evidentiary burdens and
proof of causation.
IV. BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON: FRAUD ON THE MARKET
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 0 5 the Supreme Court endorsed a
second exception to the List'0° reliance requirement: fraud on the
market. 0 7 Basic found that the Sixth Circuit correctly applied a
presumption, supported by the fraud on the market theory, that
the plaintiff class relied upon the integrity of the market price
when they sold their securities.108 Because only four justices formed
the Court majority,'09 with the five conservative justices either
,01 Id. at 152-53.
103 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
10, Id. at 990.
101 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 978, 993 (1988).
'" List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
101 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
M Id. at 990-92.
109 Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 978.
1989-90]
418 KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [VOL. 78
dissenting or not participating, 110 the ultimate status of the fraud
on the market theory may await future adjudication.
Under the fraud on the market theory, lower courts have almost
uniformly adopted a rebuttable presumption of reliance in cases
involving public material misrepresentations in the open market.,"
This doctrine, which focuses on the reliance requirement of SEC
Rule lOb-5 as a manifestation of the more expansive concept of
causation,1' 2 rests on two propositions. First, in open secondary
markets, the price of stock is determined by all available material
information."3 Second, investors rely on the integrity of market
prices when making investment decisions." 4
110 Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented to the relevant portions of
the majority opinion discussing the fraud on the market issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy did not participate in the decision. Id.
- See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) ("If plaintiffs make
such a showing [of a material misrepresentation made by defendants], the court will presume
that the misrepresentations occasioned an increase in the stock's value that, in turn, induced
the plaintiffs to purchase the stock."); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 n.9
(8th Cir. 1986) (court held that certain bond purchasers established reliance by proving that
the defendant's misleading prospectus had inflated the open market bond prices), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (11th Cir.
1984) (Fraud on the market theory "simply recognizes that reliance may be presumed where
securities are traded on the open market."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney
& Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okl. Irr. Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983)
(court held that plaintiff met its burden by establishing that the defendants had placed
unauthorized bonds on the market), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thomson, Fairchild,
Laugworthy, Kohn & Van Dyke v. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc., 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer
v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff enjoyed a presumption of reliance when
she based her decision to buy defendant's stock on the defendant's misrepresentation that
appeared in The Wall Street Journal), cert. granted sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer,
458 U.S. 1005, judgment vacated and complaint dismissed, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Ross v.
A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979) (court held that the plaintiff arguably
stated a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants'
misleading statements affected the market price of defendants' stock, even though plaintiffs
did not allege direct reliance); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) ("We
think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by proof
of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, without direct proof of reliance."),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism
of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.
L. REv. 435 (1984); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under
SEC Rule lOb-5, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 627 (1982); Rapp, Rule lOb-5 and "Fraud on the
Market"--Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 861 (1982).
1,2 See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989 ("Reliance provides the requisite causal connection
between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury .... There is, however,
more than one way to demonstrate the causal connection.").
"I See, e.g., Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991.
114 The theory was perhaps best explained by the Third Circuit:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined
FRAu ON THE MARKET
Based upon these postulates, Basic held that it is appropriate
to allow a plaintiff to invoke a presumption of reliance in actions
under Rule lOb-5 when the plaintiff has alleged and proven four
elements: that the defendant made public misrepresentations; that
the misrepresentations were material; that the shares in question
were bought or sold on an efficient market; and that the plaintiff
traded on that market between the time the misrepresentation was
made and the time the truth was revealed." 5
According to the fraud on the market theory, a plaintiff be-
comes injured when the market appraises the price of the plaintiff's
stock based upon the information misrepresented by the defen-
dant." 6 Damages arise when an investor either buys stock in an
artificially-inflated market or sells stock in an artificially-depressed
market, thereby paying or receiving a different price for the shares
than if there had been no material fraud." 7 Regardless of an
investor's knowledge of any particular statement that turns out to
have been a misrepresentation, an investor presumably trades in
the market generally with expectations that the market price has
been fairly set and is free from manipulation." 8
A. The Supreme Court's Rationale for Adopting Fraud on the
Market
Scattered throughout the Basic decision are three distinct ar-
guments that support a presumption of reliance based upon the
by the available material information regarding the company and its busi-
ness .... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The
causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase
of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance
on misrepresentations.
Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61.
Its Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992-93.
116 See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D.Tex. 1980):
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon in-
formation is into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor.
With the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and
buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form
of a market price. Thus, the market is performing a substantial part of the
valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The
market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given
all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price.
Id. at 143.
"I See T.J. Raney & Sons, 717 F.2d at 1332 ("Material misinformation will theoreti-
cally cause the artificial inflation or deflation of the stock price.").
M See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
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fraud on the market theory. The essence of the Court's syllogism
is that because causation can be sufficiently established without
direct proof of reliance, a presumption of reliance is especially
appropriate where the evidentiary difficulties of proving reliance
impede the certification of class actions and thereby threaten the
underlying policies of the securities acts.
1. Causation May Be Established By Means Other Than
Reliance
The Supreme Court in Basic observed that although reliance
remains an element of the 10b-5 implied right of action,119 positive
proof of reliance may be unnecessary where causation can be
proven sufficiently by other means. 20 The Supreme Court used
identical reasoning to dispense with reliance in two previous deci-
sions, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.'2 1 and Affiliated Ute."2
Mills dealt with an action under Rule 14a-9, which prohibits
fraud in connection with proxy solicitations and is quite similar to
Rule lOb-5.123 In that case, the plaintiffs' proof that votes necessary
for approval of a merger were obtained by way of a materially
misleading proxy solicitation also served to establish the necessary
causal connection between the defendants' wrong and the plaintiffs'
injury12 Thus, the plaintiffs' proof of materiality was sufficient
to also establish causation.125 Mills theorized that where a reason-
able investor would have the propensity to rely upon a misleading
proxy statement, one may assume enough investors did in fact rely
on the statement to sufficiently taint the entire vote.126 An actual
inquiry into the reliance of each investor upon the defect in the
solicitation materials was not required because it was "the proxy
solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation
materials, [that was the] essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction."'' 27
"1 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
120 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
M 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
'2 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
'1 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 378 (1970). Rule 14a-9 generally
prohibits fraud in connection with proxy solicitations.
- Id. at 384.
121 Id. at 385.
126 Id. at 384.
I Id. at 385.
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Similarly, Affiliated Ute also found that proof of reliance is
unnecessary to establish causation. 12s As stated previously, 129 Affil-
iated Ute dispensed with proof of reliance in suits "involving
primarily a failure to disclose" as long as the plaintiff could
establish materiality "in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered [the omitted facts to be] important" to his or her
investment decision. 30 Hence, causation was established by the
materiality of the omission in that case rather than by reliance.
Between these two decisions, Mills clearly provides the stronger
foundation for Basic. Both Basic and Mills attempt to protect the
integrity of an evaluational process whereby the rights of individual
investors are determined. Mills considered an evaluation of the
fairness of certain merger terms by a shareholder vote;' Basic
considered the evaluation of a security by the open market. 3 2 Both
of these cases reflect an awareness that individual reliance is irrel-
evant where the integrity of the evaluational process can otherwise
be shown to be affected by fraud.
The Supreme Court's reference to Affiliated Ute presents the-
oretical difficulties. Affiliated Ute involved a series of face-to-face
transactions where the defendants encouraged investors, with whom
they had a fiduciary relationship, to sell stock for less than fair
value without disclosing that the defendants were market-makers
in the stock. 3 3 Unlike Mills, the evaluational process in Affiliated
Ute took place through individual investors judging the value of
stock for themselves based upon individual transactions with the
defendants. 34 Unable to rely upon the integrity of an impersonal
evaluation process, Affiliated Ute offers no support for its conclu-
sion that causation is more probable when both materiality and a
duty to speak are present. 3s
Of course, Basic's adoption of fraud on the market depends
upon the actual efficiency of the securities markets. By the Court's
own terms, a claim of fraud on the market cannot stand unless
's Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152-54.
129 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
,30 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
" Mills, 396 U.S. at 377.
See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 (quoting LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 143).
" Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
"'3 Id. at 152 ("The mixed-blood sellers 'considered these defendants to be familiar
with the market for the shares of stock and relied upon them when they desired to sell their
shares."') (quoting Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970)).
115 Id. at 153-54.
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the plaintiff proves the market in which the securities were traded
was in fact efficient. 136 "It is an article of faith" in securities laws
that the market responds to all available information. 137 One must
wonder whether it is prudent for the Supreme Court to effectively
abandon the reliance requirement in these cases'38 partially based
upon a theory "which may or may not prove accurate upon further
consideration." 139
2. Plaintiff's Evidentiary Burden of Proving Reliance is
Unreasonable
The Basic Court also supported its presumption of reliance
with the notion that a plaintiff suffers an unreasonable evidentiary
burden when required to prove reliance upon public misrepresen-
tations affecting the open market. 4° Basic stated that the unrea-
sonableness of this burden results from "[riequiring a plaintiff to
show a speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if
omitted material information had been disclosed, . .. or if the
misrepresentation had not been made," when the plaintiff has
traded on an impersonal market. 141
One cannot question that the evidentiary difficulties associated
with the proof of reliance in 10b-5 class actions are staggering. In
Blackie v. Barrack 42 for example, shareholders brought a class
action suit alleging material public misrepresentations concerning
the corporate finances. 143 The class' cause of action was based on
a period that extended for twenty-seven months involving over
120,000 transactions in approximately 21,000,000 shares. 144 The
Blackie court decided to "eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs
prove reliance directly in this context because the requirement
imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden."' 14
36 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992 n.27.
,37 Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
13s See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 n.22 ("We doubt the right to disprove causation will
substantially reduce a defendant's liability in the open market fraud context, as we doubt
that a defendant would be able to prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction that a
plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud.").
n3 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 995 (White, J., dissenting).
,40 Id. at 990.
141 Id.
1, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
141 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 894.
I" Id. at 901.
141 Id. at 907.
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Mills provides an early example of similar difficulties in the
context of a Rule 14a-9 class action suit. In Mills, 317,000 votes
in favor of the merger were obtained by proxy, each "necessary
and indispensable to the approval of the merger."' 4 Where class
actions are involved, meaning by definition that the number of
plaintiffs is "so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable, ' 147 it would be impractical for each plaintiff to take the
stand and testify that he or she relied upon the misrepresented
facts. Thus, the Supreme Court in Mills outlined what has become
the fundamental problem in fraud on the market cases: "proof of
actual reliance by thousands of individuals would ... not be
feasible.' 14
The impracticability of certifying a class of purchasers or sellers
required to prove reliance has become the driving force behind the
fraud on the market theory. 149 Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure"50 provides that "questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class [must] predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members" in order for class
certification to be proper.' 5' According to Basic, "[riequiring proof
of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plain-
tiff class effectively would have prevented [the plaintiffs] from
proceeding with a class action, since individual issues would then
have overwhelmed the common ones.' ' 52 Thus, courts have applied
this presumption of reliance where proof of actual reliance would
be impractical or impossible. 153
Again, Basic's reference to Affiliated Ute here seems perplex-
ing. Basic cites Affiliated Ute for the proposition that it is unrea-
sonable to require a plaintiff to prove reliance upon a material
omission because it involves speculation.Y5 4 Yet the Supreme Court's
decision in Affiliated Ute was based solely upon the notion that
reliance is not required to prove a "course of business" or a
"device, scheme, or artifice" that operates as a fraud under Rule
I- Mills, 396 U.S. at 379.
147 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
4 Mills, 396 U.S. at 382 n.5.
1' See Jackson v. First Fed. Say. of Arkansas, F.A., 709 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Ark.
1988).
I" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
1"1 Id.
112 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
" See Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 19"8).
114 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990.
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lOb-5.155 Clearly, the Basic decision reflects the host of lower court
cases'56 that have interpreted and modified Affiliated Ute to stand
for the proposition that the presumption of reliance in omissions
cases is necessary because it is difficult to show reliance upon an
omission.
3. Presumption of Reliance Facilitates Goals of Securities Acts
The Supreme Court in Basic also asserted that the presumption
of reliance supports the congressional policies of the securities laws
by facilitating 10b-5 litigation. 5 7 The Court stated that Congress
intended the Securities Act of 1934 to "facilitate an investor's
reliance on the integrity of [securities] markets,' '1 58 basing its con-
clusion on the notion that markets respond to all available infor-
mation. 19 This brief pronouncement by the Court is indicative of
the fact that neither the goals nor the legislative history of the
securities acts provide a compelling justification for use of the
fraud on the market theory.' 60
Indeed, the fraud on the market theory may actually conflict
with the goals and legislative history of the securities acts. The
fraud on the market theory arguably may subvert the federal
securities policy of fairness'6 1 by abandoning reliance, thereby al-
lowing overinclusive recoveries. 62 Allowing the presumption to be
rebutted does not effectively prevent overinclusive plaintiff recov-
eries because defendants will not be able to convince a jury that
the plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud. 163 In reality, re-
"I Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152-53.
156 See supra note 91.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990-91.
136 Id. at 991.
1s9 Id.
11 Most lower courts that have accepted fraud on the market theory fail to mention
the intended policy or legislative history of the securities acts at all. See, e.g., Zlotnick v.
Tie Commun., 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988); Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1987); Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S.
- 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988); T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d 1330; Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134.
161 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 ("Congress purposed [by enacting Section 10(b)] to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether
conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges.").
162 See supra- note 16. While the presumption of reliance in lOb-5 actions prevents
individual questions of reliance from impeding class certification, it also allows recoveries
to class members who did not rely.
163 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906-07 n.22.
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butting the presumption of reliance becomes "virtually impossible"
for the defendant in the vast majority of cases. 1" The presumption
of reliance thus enacts a scheme of "investors' insurance ' 165 by
essentially eliminating a defendant's ability to defend against any
investor trading in the market. 166 Even in Basic, "virtually every
member of the [plaintiff] class made money from his or her sale
of Basic stock."' 1 7 Hence, fraud on the market is an aid to recovery
even to those plaintiffs who actually make money upon the sale of
their securities, but claim that misrepresentations have hurt their
profits. Recovery occurs regardless of whether these plaintiffs ac-
tually relied on such misrepresentations.
Additionally, the "specter of Draconian liability' 6 1 caused by
overinclusive recoveries is thought to conflict with the Court's past
concerns that lOb-5 litigation gives substantial settlement values
even to plaintiffs with flimsy claims. 169 One can argue that the
policy of fairness underlying the securities acts is not met when
overinclusive recoveries can ruin a corporation that received no
direct benefit from the alleged shift in market value.170 A workable
theory of damages must be developed under the fraud on the
market theory before courts can establish an appropriate and fair
balance between enhanced plaintiff recovery and oppressive defen-
dant liability. The Supreme Court chose not to address the issue
of damages in Basic.
Commentators have also criticized the fraud on the market
theory for ignoring the congressional policies of disclosure embod-
ied in the securities acts.' 7' The securities acts are intended to
protect the public by promoting full disclosure of information
See LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 143 n.4.
" See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Doing away with the
conventional reliance requirement in a lOb-5 case... could establish a scheme of investors'
insurance."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463
(2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis omitted) ("[Tihe aim of [Rule lob-5] in cases such as this is to
qualify, as between insiders and outsiders, the doctrine of caveat emptor-not to establish
a scheme of investors' insurance."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811.
" See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906-07 n.22 ("We doubt the right to disprove causation
will substantially reduce a defendant's liability in the open market fraud context, as we
doubt that a defendant would be able to prove in many instances to a jury's satisfaction
that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud.").
117 108 S. Ct. at 998.
"' See Black, supra note I11, at 461.
"' See Black, supra note I11, at 460-61 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975)).
170 See id.
1 Id. at 457-59.
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necessary for the decisions of investors. 172 The theory is that con-
gressional disclosure policies underlying the securities acts are de-
feated if plaintiffs are allowed to recover under 10b-5 without
having read disclosure documents. 173 Allowing a plaintiff to recover
for fraud without having read or relied upon a defendant's public
disclosures would undercut the plaintiff's incentive to read the
documents. 174 Hence, many argue that investors' reckless failure to
inform themselves should disqualify them from recovering under
Rule 10b-5.1 75
Finally, fraud on the market directly contradicts the legislative
history of the securities acts. During the drafting process of Section
18 of the 1934 Act, 76 an antifraud provision similar to 10b-5,
Congress expressly rejected a provision very similar to the fraud
on the market theory that allowed plaintiffs to recover solely by
showing the price of a security they traded was affected by a
misrepresentation.177 By adding a substantial reliance requirement
back into that section, Congress presumably intended that reliance
be present before a plaintiff can recover. 78  The comments of
172 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The design of the
[Securities Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions."); SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n,
Inc., 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941) ("The aim ... of the Securities Act is to protect
the public by requiring that it be furnished with adequate information upon which to make
investments."); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77a) ("[Goal is] to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold in interstate and foreign commerce.").
173 See Shores, 647 F.2d at 483 (Randall, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
[D]isclosure ... is crucial to the way in which the federal securities laws
function .... [Tihe federal securities laws are intended to put investors into
a position from which they can help themselves by relying upon disclosures
that others are obligated to make. This system is not furthered by allowing
monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for themselves. If we say
that a plaintiff may recover in some circumstances even though he did not
read and rely on the defendants' public disclosures, then no one need pay
attention to those disclosures and the method employed by Congress to achieve
the objective of the 1934 Act is defeated.
Id.
75 See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1418
(11th Cir. 1983) (reasonable diligence); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.
1977) (due diligence).
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a).
"7 See Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. Res. 84, 56, & 97 before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, p. 6638 (1934) (statement
of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange).
178 See 78 Cong. Rec. 7701 (1934) (statements of Representative Sam Rayburn) ("[The]
bill as originally written was very much challenged on the ground that reliance should be
required. This objection has been met.").
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Representative Sam Rayburn illustrate the political compromise
that took place:
The first provision of the bill as originally written was very much
challenged on the ground that reliance should be required. This
objection has been met. In other words, if a man bought a
security following a prospectus that carried a false or misleading
statement, he could not recover from the man who sold to him,
nor could the seller be punished criminally, unless the buyer
bought the security with knowledge of the statement and relied
upon the statement.
79
The legislative history of this Section 18 remains highly relevant to
understanding the lOb-5 reliance requirement, by demonstrating
the intent of Congress to limit the scope of damages under the
antifraud provisions through the requirement that plaintiffs prove
reliance upon material fraud.180
B. Defenses to Fraud on the Market
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that the presumption of
reliance created by the fraud on the market theory is rebuttable.1 8'
The Court indicated that any evidence breaking the causal connec-
tion between the misrepresentation and either the price of the
security or the investor's decision to trade can serve to rebut the
presumption. 8 2 Basic also articulated that defendants could rebut
by showing that the plaintiffs did not trade in reliance upon the
integrity of the market. 83
As a preliminary matter, a number of courts have questioned
the value of allowing this presumption to be rebutted. Justice
White, writing for the Basic dissent, joined by Justice O'Connor,
I" Id.
11 This argument-that the congressional intent from § 18 demanding reliance also
applies to § lOb-is supported by the Supreme Court's practice of interpreting statutes by
reference to provisions from the same or related legislation. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 202-06 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
108 S. Ct. at 993.
2 Id. at 992. The court of appeals had set out essentially four defenses to the
presumption of reliance under the fraud on the market theory: (1) the elements giving rise
to the presumption are not satisfied; (2) the plaintiff did not rely on the integrity of the
market price; (3) the defendant's misrepresentations did not affect the price of the security;
or (4) the plaintiff would have traded even with knowledge of the falseness of the statement.
Basic, 786 F.2d at 750 n.6 (citing Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906).
18, Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
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asserted that the presumption of reliance is not rebuttable by the
defendant as a practical matter. 84 The dissent believed that the
majority's opinion operates as a theory of pure causation, creating
a nonrebuttable presumption of reliance.'85 Similarly, in the case
of In re LTV Securities Litigation,16 the district court observed
that "given the force of the presumption ... the resulting reality
[is] that [the defendant's rebuttal] would likely be futile in the vast
number of cases."' 8 7 Furthermore, in Blackie, the Ninth Circuit
admitted that the right to rebut the presumption provides no real
limit on the defendant's liability because the jury's inquiry usually
ceases once the materiality of the defendant's misrepresentation is
established.'88 These cases indicate that attempts to limit the op-
pressive liability imposed upon defendants under the fraud on the
market theory have not been entirely successful.
1. Misrepresentations Not Causing Plaintiff's Damage
In Basic, the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant could
rebut the presumption of reliance by breaking the causal connection
between the market price and the misrepresentation, 89 i.e., by
showing that the fraudulent conduct did not cause the plaintiff's
loss.
The Court first indicated that a defendant could show that
market-makers had some access to the true version of whatever
had been misrepresented by the corporation.19' In this situation,
the price of the security would not be affected by the false state-
ment because market-makers would not have bought or sold, or
rendered advice in reliance upon the misrepresentation. Alterna-
tively, Basic stated that a defendant could establish that truth
filtered into the market itself, thereby offsetting any effects of the
fraud.' 9' Although the market may be efficient in these scenarios,
the price of the stock would not be affected because an insufficient
number of investors would have relied upon the misstatements. 92
I" Id. at 996 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
185 Id.
" LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134.
" Id. at 143 n.4.
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906-07 n.22.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
190 Id.
19 Id.
"9 See Black, supra note 11, at 448.
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The Court left open the possibility of developing additional
methods for showing that the fraud did not cause damage to the
plaintiff by finding that "any showing" breaking the causal con-
nection is sufficient to rebut the presumption. 193 The argument that
the defendant is not liable when the conduct causes no damage to
the plaintiff involves overlapping issues of rebuttable presumptions
and damages. Establishing that the price differentiation suffered
by the plaintiff was not caused by the defendant's fraud would
likely involve the services of a special master or the testimony of
an expert witness. 194 This individual presumably could calculate
damages from available data according to one of the various
damages theories associated with fraud on the market. 95
2. Plaintiff's Decision to Trade at a Fair Price
Basic also stated that the defendant can rebut the presumption
by severing the causal link between "the alleged misrepresentation
and ... his decision to trade at a fair market price.' ' 96 According
to the Court, a defendant could sever the causal link between the
misrepresentation and the plaintiff's decision to trade at a fair
price by showing that the plaintiff knew the price was affected by
fraud, but traded anyway for unrelated business or political rea-
sons.'9 7 In this situation, the individual plaintiff would not have
relied upon the misrepresentations.
The case of Grossman v. Waste Management'98 illustrates this
defense. 99 One of the plaintiffs traded her shares in a target
corporation for shares in the acquiring corporation without knowl-
edge of a one billion dollar liability not disclosed by the acquiring
I'l Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
,94 See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 553-54.
'19 See, e.g., Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984); Note, Rule 10b-5 Developments:
Damages and Contribution, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 997 (1982); Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. Rlv. 371
(1973-74); Note, Rule l0b-5 Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory to
Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 FoRD. L. REv. 838 (1982-83); Recent Development,
Damages For Insider Trading in the Open Market: A New Limitation on Recovery Under
Rule l0b-5, 34 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1981).
19 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
19, Id.
I" Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
' For a discussion of Grossman in the context of defenses to fraud on the market,
see Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an
Implied l0b-5 Action, 70 IowA L. Rav. 975, 988-90 (1984-85).
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corporation. 200 The plaintiff admitted at trial that, even if she had
known of the liability, she still would have traded because she
misconstrued her rights in the transaction.20 1 This defense provides
the correct result because, in the investor's mind, the other factors
relevant to the investment decision had more importance than the
omitted fact.
The Third Circuit's recent opinion in Zlotnick v. Tie
Communications2°2 adds an interesting twist to this defense. In
Zlotnick, an investor sold stock short2 3 on the belief, based upon
his analysis of the company's earnings and projections, that the
price was overvalued and would fall. Due to fraudulent press
releases to the public, however, the price of the stock rose dra-
matically, forcing Zlotnick to minimize his losses by covering his
short sale.2 4 The Third Circuit held that, although Zlotnick lost
nearly $35,000 in the transaction, presumptions of reliance under
the fraud on the market theory do not apply to short sellers because
short sellers do not rely on the integrity of the market.20 5 Thus,
Zlotnick established the rule that short sellers must show actual
reliance upon the defendant's representations. 206
The Third Circuit's analysis fails to properly apply the fraud
on the market standard. Denying use of the fraud on the market
theory to anyone who thought the price of a security was too high
or too low would effectively limit the doctrine to unsophisticated
investors. Because most investors buy or sell securities with some
20 Grossman, 589 F. Supp. 412-13.
01 Id. at 412.
- Zlotnick, 836 F.2d 818.
203
Where the traditional investor seeks to profit by trading a stock the value of
which he expects to rise, a short seller seeks to profit by trading stocks which
he expects to decline in value.
Short selling is accomplished by selling stock which the investor does not
yet own; normally this is done by borrowing shares from a broker at an
agreed upon fee or rate of interest. At this point the investor's commitment
to the buyer of the stock is complete; the buyer has his shares and the short
seller [i.e., the investor] has his purchase price. The short seller is obligated
... to buy an equivalent number of shares in order to return the borrowed
shares. . . . Herein lies the short seller's potential for profit: if the price of
the stock declines after the short sale, he does not need all the funds to make
his covering purchase; the short seller then pockets the difference.... [I]f the
price of the stock rises, so too does the short seller's loss.
Id. at 820.
1' Id. at 819.
Id. at 823-24.
20 Id. at 823.
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sort of opinion regarding how the price of the stock will change, 20 7
only investors with minimal awareness of a company's financial
situation could recover under the Zlotnick approach. An investor
with an opinion regarding whether the market has incorrectly de-
termined the price of a stock still relies on the fact that there has
been no fraudulent manipulation of that stock. An investor who
sells short may simply disagree with the market concerning future
events affecting the company, or whether the company will remain
solvent, while still relying that no hidden factors are influencing
the market. Thus, an investor's determination that a security is
improperly priced remains a decision to trade at a fair and repre-
sentative market price. Under the fraud on the market theory as
applied to short sellers, the presumption of reliance should be
denied only when the short seller's disagreement with the market
arises from an awareness of facts that have been misrepresented.
3. Plaintiff's Reliance on Integrity of the Market
Finally, Basic held that the presumption of reliance could be
rebutted by showing that the plaintiffs traded their shares without
relying upon the integrity of the market. 20 The idea that an investor
relies on the integrity of the market was first set out in Blackie.209
According to Blackie, the investor "relies generally on the suppo-
sition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly
on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price.9 210
It is not clear how a defendant shows that a particular plaintiff
did not rely on the integrity of the market. Basic asserted that a
plaintiff who knows the stock price is affected by fraud but who
sells the shares anyway for independent reasons does not rely upon
the integrity of the market.21' The issue that arises is whether the
plaintiff must be aware of the falsity of the statements in question
for the defendant to rebut on these grounds.
A significant body of cases allows the defendant to show that
the plaintiff did not rely on the integrity of the market even though
See Black, supra note 111, at 455 ("[M]any investors purchase or sell stock because
they believe the price inaccurately reflects the corporations worth.").
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
210 Id.
211 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
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the plaintiff had no knowledge of the fraud. 2 2 In such situations,
the presumption is rebutted when a defendant can show that the
investor relied "upon factors extraneous to the market.''213 Such
extraneous factors usually involve trading securities on the advice
of a third party.214
The courts should not, however, overemphasize the importance
of the plaintiff's reliance on factors extraneous to the market. Just
because a plaintiff relies on the advice of a third party does not
mean he or she is indifferent to fraudulent pricing. The investor
and the advisor both still may assume that the price of the stock
has not been manipulated through fraud. Such extraneous factors
only have relevance when they serve to establish that the plaintiff
would have traded in the security even if the plaintiff had known
the truth.
CONCLUSION
According to Basic, a court may apply a rebuttable presump-
tion of reliance where a plaintiff has purchased securities in an
efficient market that has been affected by a defendant's material
misrepresentation or omission. Following the rationale of Mills,
the fraud on the market theory is an attempt to establish causation
by deducing that once the materiality of the defendant's fraud has
been established and the court has concluded that a reasonable
investor would have the propensity to rely upon such fraud, the
probability is great enough to presume that the plaintiffs did in
fact so rely and to shift the burden of proof to the defendants to
show otherwise.
Fraud on the market arose to facilitate the certification of
plaintiffs' class action suits under Rule lOb-5, which have otherwise
been impeded because issues of individual plaintiff's reliance often
predominate over questions of law or fact common to the class.
Yet, the fraud on the market theory may ultimately prove inade-
quate to facilitate 10b-5 class action recovery if the efficient market
hypothesis is itself incorrect. Having studied the causes and effects
212 See, e.g., Markewich v. Ersek, 98 F.R.D. 9, 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); McNichols v.
Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer
Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Greenspan v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130, 132-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
213 LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 143-44.
234 See Beissinger, 529 F. Supp. at 786-87 (relying on recommendation of the employee
of a client).
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of Black Monday, many economists and academicians believe that
the efficient market hypothesis is flawed and that the markets are
not entirely efficient. 21 5
There still exist theoretical and practical difficulties with the
legal framework established by Affiliated Ute and Basic. Distinc-
tions between omissions and misrepresentations lack any theoretical
basis in either Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5, and the evidentiary
difficulties associated with proving reliance do not exist where face-
to-face transactions are involved. Additionally, distinctions between
omissions and misrepresentations appear to impede judicial effi-
ciency because of the difficulty courts have had applying Affiliated
Ute.2 6 Finally, Basic remains difficult to apply because the decision
failed to establish any standard by which a market may be deter-
mined to be efficient.
Because only four justices joined in the Basic decision, the
Supreme Court may ultimately modify or abandon the fraud on
the market theory. There certainly are other alternatives to a pre-
sumption of reliance, such as resolving the reliance issue along
with that of damages in a bifurcated class action. This procedure
would promote the same purposes as fraud on the market while
shielding defendants from the oppressive and draconian liability
that results from the settlement value of even a frivolous claim
under fraud on the market. While courts should continue to facil-
itate plaintiff recovery under the securities laws, such recovery must
not take place to the detriment of traditional concepts of fairness
and equity.
R. Douglas Martin
2u See Hector, What Makes Stock Prices Move, FORTuNE, Oct. 10, 1988, at 69.
M See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981); Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The class members' substantive claims
either are, or can be, cast in omission or nondisclosure terms . . ."); Mottoros v. Abrams,
524 F. Supp. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[T]he claims of plaintiff Mottoros are basically
hybrid in nature. They are neither wholly misrepresentations, nor wholly omissions.");
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1981) ("In many
instances, an omission to state a material fact relates back to an earlier statement, and if
it is reasonable to think that that prior statement still stands, then the omission may also
be termed a misrepresentation. The labels by themselves, therefore, are of little help.");
Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 592 F. Supp. 112, 121 (1984) (following Wilson).
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